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LEVINAS ON LAW
A Derridean Reading of Manderson's Proximity, Levinas, and the
Soul of Law
Jacques de Ville*
In this article, Desmond Manderson's book, Proximity, Levinas,
and the Soul of Law (2006), is analysed specifically with
reference to the accuracy with which it translates Derrida's
thinking into law. Manderson, in a number of instances, invokes
Derrida's thinking as a 'corrective' to that of Levinas. The author
shows that this invocation by Manderson of Derrida's texts is
selective and does not take account of Derrida's broader
'philosophical' approach. The author points to the differences
between, but also the correspondence in the thinking of, Levinas
and Derrida. He contends that being true to Derrida's thinking
requires that proximity be viewed not as simply making law
responsive as proposed by Manderson, but as having a
paradoxical structure. The latter would give expression to the
distinction that Derrida draws between the conditional and the
unconditional. Only if proximity is viewed in this manner will
judges be faced with a true responsibility in deciding negligence
cases; only then will justice stand a chance.
Introduction
Translating Levinas into law is not a task that many legal scholars undertake.
There are, however, a number of scholars who in recent years have made
admirable attempts to do so.1 In this article, I reflect on some of the difficulties
involved in translating Levinas into law through a 'Derridean' reading of the
recently published book of Desmond Manderson, Proximity, Levinas, and the
Soul of Law. This book makes a valuable attempt at translating a number of
Professor of Law, University of the Western Cape. An earlier version of this
article was first presented as a paper at the conference Levinas and Law, McGill
University, 17-18 September 2006. 1 would like to express my gratitude to the
participants and especially to the host, Desmond Manderson, for their thoughtful
comments on this paper. The same goes for the comments received from the
anonymous reviewers of this article.
1 See, for example, Cornell (1992); Douzinas (2000); Diamantides (2000, 2003).
2 Manderson (2006). A shorter version of Manderson's reading of Levinas within
the context of tort law was published in this journal; see Manderson (2005). The
reading I adopt here will not seek to establish whether Manderson remains 'true',
in a traditional sense, to Levinas's philosophy. Instead it will be a reading in what
could be referred to as a certain 'Derridean style' where the heterogeneity of the
text that is being read is explored.
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Levinasian themes into law, specifically in the context of tort law. These
include the relation between the saying and the said, the distinction between
law, politics and ethics, the 'Other' and the third, as well as responsibility and
proximity. Manderson's book compels us to reflect on these topics as well as
on important legal concepts such as reasonableness and public policy. My
analysis of this book will not be restricted to tort law. I will seek to draw out
the broader implications of Levinas's thinking for law. The themes referred to
above will be explored by closely following Derrida's reading of Levinas, a
reading which I insist is essential for Levinas's thinking to have an impact on
law. I start this analysis by giving an overview of the main arguments of
Manderson's book.
Proximity and (Tort) Law
The most important contribution that Manderson makes is showing how the
law (the said) always contains within itself a trace of the saying. It is
particularly notable that Manderson realises and acknowledges the importance
of language in law and the necessity to reflect on this language.3 Manderson
points us to the legal concept of proximity and shows us the radical
transformative potential of this concept in relation to the law of negligence.
The concept of proximity, he shows us, stands opposed to rigid rules of law
which attempt at deciding the case beforehand. Proximity opens us to the
event; it calls on us to put the law into question. 4 Compared with some other
authors who have translated the thinking of Levinas and Derrida into law,
5
Manderson is much more optimistic about (case) law and the possibility of
transformation on a less grand scale. Manderson, we can say, attempts to make
the law of negligence more 'hospitable' with reference to the thought ofS•6
Levinas and with reference to the experience or event of proximity, which he
describes with reference to Levinas inter alia as 'a closeness to others giving
rise to responsibility'.
7
Manderson points out that proximity, as developed by the courts, is
closely tied to the responsibility we owe others. This is both the case in the
law of negligence and in the thinking of Levinas on proximity. 9 Manderson
mourns the fact that this concept 10 is disappearing from the Australian law of
negligence, because of its apparent 'vagueness', irrelevance and inadequacy as
3 See Manderson (2006), pp 17, 21-25.
4 Manderson (2006), pp 194-95.
5 See, for example, Douzinas (2000), pp 343-69. See also the discussion of
Diamantides in Manderson (2006), p 10.
6 Manderson (2006), pp 90, 174 says that proximity is not a concept.
7 Manderson (2006), p 90.
8 Manderson (2006), p 15.
9 Manderson (2006), p 15.
10 This is my word, not Manderson's, also elsewhere in this article. I will also use
'notion' to refer to proximity, which is again not how Manderson would refer to
proximity. My difference with Manderson in this respect will be explained below.
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a 'tool'. 11 He argues for its retention and its central importance for the law of
negligence. Manderson specifically believes that there is value in 'an idea
which is not reducible to a rule'. 12 The 'incapacity of definition' of this notion,
Manderson argues, is the very source of its ethical power.13 For Manderson,
proximity is in other words the 'ethical component' of law. 14 He argues that
proximity:
institutionalizes a kind of permanent revolution in the law, and a refusal
to be satisfied with the present order. It institutionalizes a constant
doubt and questioning that makes justice possible. 15
According to Manderson, the legal notion of proximity proceeds from the
Levinasian prior ethical relation found in proximity, which thus provides the
foundation of law (and justice). 16 The ethical notion of proximity, we can also
say, is the moving force of law and justice.17 As we will see below, proximity
contains its own inherent limits. In addition, the standard of care in the law of
negligence (reasonableness) places limits on one's responsibility for the Other,
by taking account of the interests of other Others.
Manderson's approach can, in light of the above, be summarised as
follows: he translates Levinas's thinking about the ethical responsibility that is
owed to the Other and the entry of the third into the responsibility of one
person to another (prior to law) which the law (the third) should recognise
(which indeed, according to him, happens through the legal concept of
proximity (the duty of care) and reasonableness (the standard of care)).
Proximity in law allows for an encounter with the Other (through the openness
and responsiveness of this concept) and reasonableness (the standard of care)
allows for the balancing of this responsibility with the duty that is owed to
other Others. Manderson's model seems to successfully translate what Levinas
says regarding the Other and the third into the law of negligence. The Other to
whom an infinite responsibility is owed within this scheme is someone who is
in a position of vulnerability and 'the third' is the law and legal institutions
through which the concerns of other Others are dealt with. The responsibility
that an individual owes to the Other is thus viewed as already existing before18
the law (or language or philosophy) comes into play. Ethics, Manderson• -
- ~19 - - •,
says, inspires law from the outside. The judiciary (an 'institution of the
third' )20 is necessary in order to enable us to fulfil our responsibility to other
1 Manderson (2006), p 15.
12 Manderson (2006), p 15.
13 Manderson (2006), p 15.
14 Manderson (2006), p 16.
15 Manderson (2006), p 16.
16 Manderson (2006), p 19.
17 Manderson (2006), p 19.
18 Manderson (2006), p 8.
19 Manderson (2006), p 183.
20 See Manderson (2006), p 182.
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Others; these institutions witness and bear testimony to our asymmetrical
responsibility.
2 1
The Saying and the Said
From the above, it should be clear that Manderson does not want to draw too
rigid a distinction between the saying and the said. Manderson specifically
takes issue with Levinas as the latter, according to him, treats the ethical realm
'as entirely incommensurable with the political realm'. 22 There is in other
words, according to Manderson and contrary to what Levinas (sometimes)
asserts, something in the structure of law which reflects the saying. As
indicated above, the law of proximity is, according to Manderson, the 'site' in
the law of negligence where something remains of the ethical relationship.
This is a remarkable insight and there is certainly a correlation here with the
thinking of Derrida. Derrida insists on the fact that the tradition is not univocal
but heterogeneous in its injunctions, referring here to the unconditional and the
.23
conditional. In this paragraph, I want to address two issues specifically. In
the first place, I want to ask the question whether Manderson's thinking in this
regard corresponds fully with that of Derrida, who Manderson says he is24
following. My answer to this question is in the negative. This is, of course,
not fatal to Manderson's argument. The book explicitly deals with Levinas's
thinking rather than that of Derrida. Manderson is therefore fully within his
rights to choose to follow Levinas in this respect rather than Derrida. The
second issue I want to address, which relates directly to the first issue, is to ask
whether Manderson's following of Levinas rather than Derrida does not
weaken his argument in relation to the 'ethical' in law and lead to
inconsistencies. My answer to this question is in the affirmative.
Manderson insists on following Levinas rather than Derrida in positing a
25prior ethical order and then only translating it into law. Manderson
recognises that: 'Responsibility emerges with our selfhood, with relationship,
with desire'2 6 and that: 'The demand from the other that puts me on the spot ...
constitutes me as a unique subject, a self. 2 7 He, however, attempts to free law
(communal subjectivity) from the same structure. This is in spite of his own
acknowledgement that 'I and we are two sides of the same coin, two
21 Manderson (2006), p 183.
22 Manderson (2006), pp 9, 12.
23 See, for example, Derrida (1994), p 16; and Derrida and Roudinesco (2004),
pp 3-4.
24 Manderson (2006), p 10 says that he will rely on Derrida's reading of Levinas in
this respect, specifically his views on the relation between law and justice, because
of the deficiencies in Levinas's thinking in this regard.
25 In the introduction, Manderson (2006) speaks of the 'impact' of ethics on law
(p 8), the 'influence' of ethics on legal doctrine (p 10), and the 'inspiration' that
ethics can provide for law (pp 13, 17).
26 Manderson (2006), p 63.
27 Manderson (2006), p 65.
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expressions of the totalizing essentialism of the self 28 as well as his
acknowledgment with reference to Derrida's Violence and Metaphysics that
'alterity is "already in the same," which is to say that ethics has already
contaminated the alleged rigid purity of the law'.29 If 'alterity is "already in the
same"',30 why is it still necessa 7 to go to the effort of positing an ethical order
outside of language and law?3 In doing this, Manderson can place only a
'moral' obligation on law to incorporate this responsibility to the Other by
contending that Levinas's thinking should act as an 'inspiration', 'motivation'
or 'critique' of or for law. 32 The responsibility owed to the Other is therefore
not an injunction, not a must for law, as it is in Derrida's thinking. The non-
obligation or voluntary nature of the translation of 'ethics' into law that is at
stake for Manderson is also evident when he says that 'institutions of the third'
(such as the judiciary) 'bridge our relationships with others: they do not
necessarily abandon the ethical insight of asymmetric responsibility, but
witness and testify to it.
33
According to Derrida, reading Levinas, the third is there right from the
start (in the face-to-face relation). 34 There is thus no 'prior' ethical relation 35
outside of law which inspires law. As is clear from Force of Law,
unconditional or incalculable justice, the asymmetrical relation to the Other,
'is' already in law, as its condition of possibility. It is in the initial founding
and subsequent enforcement of law that law's infinite responsibility to the
Other (justice) is instituted but at the same time deferred. 36 It is, in other
words, unnecessary to find something outside of law in order to 'inspire' law.
This 'inspiration' is a heterogeneous trace within law which simultaneously,
diachronously, overflows law. Manderson knows that the third is there from
the start, or at least the same view is found in his text, particularly when he
quotes Levinas speaking about the need for justice and the need for the
'incessant correction of the asymmetry of proximity in the face that is looked
at'. 37 Derrida reads this (or at least similar passages in Levinas) as Levinas
acknowledging that the third is there at the origin of the face to face.
38
28 Manderson (2006), p 26.
29 Manderson (2006), p 193.
30 Manderson (2006), pp 82 and 193. See also the thoughtful exposition on p 77.
31 Manderson (2006), pp 62-66.
32 Manderson (2006), p 183.
33 Manderson (2006), pp 182-83.
Derrida (1999), pp 30-33.
35 See also Manderson (2006), p 49 (also on p 67) where Manderson speaks of 'an
ethical relationship and ethics as preceding philosophy and knowledge of the
world and ... making them possible'.
36 See Derrida (1992a), pp 23 and 27.
37 Manderson (2006), p 182. See also on p 81 where Manderson accurately sets out
the criticism of Derrida (1978), p 79 concerning Levinas's reliance on language.
38 Levinas also acknowledges that 'the law is in the midst of proximity'; see Levinas
(1981), p 159.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Griffith L. Rev. 229 2007
GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2007) VOL 16 No 1
This brings us to Manderson's phenomenology. Proximity is not a
'concept' according to Manderson, but an experience. The reason why he does
not want to refer to it as a concept is because 'ethics' in Levinasian terms
(which Manderson equates with proximity) precedes, founds and exceeds
language, society and philosophy. If proximity were simply a concept, it
would no longer be an 'ethics'; it would simply be an economy and of the
order of knowledge. 40 Manderson is aware of Derrida's criticism of Levinas
regarding his views on phenomenology and language. 41 He also seems to agree
with this criticism. Manderson specifically expresses his agreement with
Derrida saying that 'our concepts are already mixed and touched by the
other'. 42 He also refers to Derrida with approval when pointing out that:
Levinas yearned to stand 'outside', once and for all: outside his skin,
outside language, outside the self. But Derrida argued that it can't be
done - there is no outside.
43
Manderson nevertheless chooses to overlook Derrida's criticism in his
own exposition of proximity. He refers to the importance of vulnerability and
control as not based on imagined attitudes or concepts, but on 'real
phenomena'. 44 Manderson also says with reference to Levinas that 'proximity
founds responsibility not on logic but on experience' and that our relationship
to others comes 'from a phenomenological connection between persons that
arises out of a particular predicament that binds together the vulnerability of
one to the response ability that singles out another'. 45 Manderson, as we can
see here, attempts to counter existing approaches to liability46 through
phenomenology - attempting thereby to ground our knowledge (the law of
negligence) in 'experience, evidence and self-presence'. 47 Stated differently,
what Manderson does is to construct a new way of thinking about the law of
negligence based on naked experience. 48 However, as Derrida points out, and
as Manderson acknowledges: 'Empiricism is thinking by metaphor without
thinking the metaphor as such.'49 Manderson, we can also say (like Levinas),
'employs a metaphysical language haunted by metaphor but refuses to
acknowledge the metaphoricity inherent within that language itself.50 What
39 Manderson (2006), p 8.
40 Manderson (2006), p 30.
41 Manderson (2006), pp 30-31, 80-81.
42 Manderson (2006), p 69.
43 Manderson (2006), p 81.
Manderson (2006), p 161.
45 Manderson (2006), p 166.
46 See the discussion in Chapter 2 of Manderson (2006).
47 See Howells (1999), p 7.
48 Derrida (1978), pp 82-83.
49 Derrida (1978) 139; Manderson (2006), pp 30-31, 80-81.
50 See Sedgwick (2001), p 220.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Griffith L. Rev. 230 2007
DE VILLE: LEVINAS ON LAW
Manderson attempts to do, through Levinas, is to 'dream the dream of a purely
heterological thought'. 51 He attempts to think the thought of a radical
responsibility for the Other and the implications of proximity, both for all of
us, every day, and for the law. As Manderson knows, this dream 'must vanish
at daybreak, as soon as language awakens', 52 and language is there from the
start. We cannot find the origins of our responsibility to the Other outside of
language, in experience. Manderson, despite his intentions, nevertheless
succeeds in showing us how it can be found in language.
Manderson can be said to be calling for a new way of judging that entails
a radical rethink of the notion of proximity in the law of negligence. This
approach calls for proximity (where vulnerability and control will be key
elements) 53 to be crucial in determining the existence of a duty of care. In the
process of elaborating on this approach throuh phenomenology, Manderson
is, despite himself, overtaken by conceptuality. 4 What Manderson effectively
does regarding proximity - a concept that can be used in law, politics, and
ethics - is to show that it exceeds its own conceptuality; what proximity
'signifies' cannot be contained within its concept. Manderson, in other words,
shows us that there is something within the legal system which exceeds itself
In the words of Naas, the very energy of Manderson's text 'is the result of the
way it inscribes traditional terms so as to break with them, or break within
them, and thereby release what is unthought and unthematizable within the
system or the text'. 55 To state it in yet other terms: there is something about
proximity which no longer belongs to it. When a court thus uses the concept or
language of proximity to determine liability, this excess - as Manderson
shows so brilliantly - lies hidden within the concept, thus making of
proximity not a unitary concept as Manderson asserts, but a paradoxical one.
Manderson effectively gives a different 'meaning' 57 to proximity by drawing
our attention to the trace that the ethical has left in law. He transforms the
meaning of the word 'proximity', investing it with a new, more hospitable
meaning.58 What we had always thought of as the unitary concept of proximity
contains an Other within itself that is no longer its Other.59 It should be clear
from the above that there is in fact no need for Manderson to posit a prior
ethical relation in order to inspire law from the outside. What he is effectively
doing is to analyse and at least partly deconstruct the concept of proximity in
law. As we will see later, by not being sufficiently attentive to his own
involvement in conceptuality, Manderson gives proximity a 'meaning' which
51 Derrida (1978), p 151.
52 Derrida (1978), 151.
53 Manderson (2006), pp 127, 135-41.
See Naas (2003), p 99 on Levinas.
55 Naas (2003), p 100 on Levinas.
56 Manderson (2006), p 172.
57 Manderson's concept of proximity, however, suffers from being still too
,meaningful'.
58 See also Naas (2003), p 101 on Levinas.
59 See Derrida (2002a), pp 362, 364 on the concept of hospitality.
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is ultimately still conceptual and which does not succeed in escaping from its
own conceptuality. Proximity can only succeed in escaping its own
conceptuality if it becomes meaningless, if it involves a general economy, if
there is no return to the self
Law, Politics and Ethics
It is interesting to note at this point that Manderson wants to draw a distinction
between law and politics. He therefore also takes issue with Levinas because
of the view Levinas takes 'of law as a mere arm of politics'. 6 1 Manderson,
following Dworkin, 62 believes that law 'serves as a separate modality of
thinking about social relations, and is not merely politics by another means'. 63
Manderson also finds fault with Levinas's seemingly formalistic view of law
'as an entirely positivistic, codified, and rule-bound structure'. 64 Manderson
rather wants to emphasise the 'fluidity and ambiguity that k[articularly] marks
the common law discourse on the "duty of care"'. The reason for
Manderson's insistence upon the distinction between law and politics appears
to be that he believes that law should not simply be about politics, which he
equates with power. 66 Law should be something else, something 'better' than
politics. Manderson, as we saw above, wants law to be ethically inspired. 67 His
views appear clearly from the following passage:
ethics insists on the necessity of our response to others, and the unique
predicament of each such response, rather than attempting to reduce
such responses to standard instances and norms of general application,
norms applicable to whole communities and capable of being largely
settled in advance. Indeed, ethics constantly destabilizes and ruptures
those rules and that settlement. Furthermore, ethics implies an
unavoidable responsibility to another which Levinas exhorts as 'first
philosophy': by this he means to indicate that without some such initial
hospitality or openness to the inarticulate cry of another human being,
60 Manderson (2006), pp 9, 186.
61 Manderson (2006), p 9.
62 In other passages, Manderson is more critical of Dworkin; see Manderson (2006),
pp 2 3-24, 202.
63 Manderson (2006), p 9.
rA Manderson (2006), p 9.
65 Manderson (2006), p 10.
66 Manderson (2006), p 18. Manderson on p 185 also refers to politics as 'the
judgment of effects in terms of comparative statistics generalized across masses in
pursuit of collective goals such as efficiency or progress'. On p 67 he says that
'Politics is the realm of totality par excellence. It weighs and calculates -
literally, totalizes - different interests on the scale of social utility, or preference,
or, from time to time, just votes.'
67 See also Manderson (2006), p 182.
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neither language nor society nor philosophy could ever have got
going.
s8
I am sympathetic to Manderson's views with regard to a relation between
'ethics' and law. Law should not simply be about power/politics, but should
indeed be more closely related to a certain Levinasian 'ethics'. I will not
attempt to provide an answer here to the question of whether it is possible -
or indeed wise - to draw a distinction between law and politics. In any event,
I believe that when one attempts to translate the thinking of Levinas and
Derrida into law, it is unnecessary to dwell too long on the possibility or
wisdom of such a distinction. This is because, whether or not we distinguish
between law and politics, both of these (as well as ethics) fall, in Derrida's
terminology, within the sphere of a restricted economy,69 to be distinguished
from a general economy, with no return to the self In Derrida's thinking
(reading Levinas), the relation between law, ethics and politics (as restricted
economies) and unconditional hospitality and justice ('ethics' in the
Levinasian sense) stand central. The latter will be discussed in more detail
below. It nevertheless needs to be noted here that absolute or unconditional
hospitality as well as justice are referred to by Derrida as a 'hyperpolitics' or a
'hyperethics', 71 and that they are not without (radical) consequences for law,
ethics and politics.
As we saw above, Manderson's following of Levinas rather than Derrida
concerning the relation of 'ethics' to law leads him into a number of
difficulties. The same may be said to be true regarding the distinction he draws
between ethics, law and politics. It was noted above that Manderson views
ethics as the foundation for law and politics. Because he mainly focuses on
'ethics' and 'law', however, he risks becoming complacent about the demands
of a Levinasian 'ethics' on certain aspects of law which are overtly 'political'
and where law's restricted economy and limited conception of equality is most
evident. 72 Manderson, despite his awareness of the feminist critique of
Levinas, 73 appears somewhat too comfortable in speaking about fraternity,
7 4
75• 76
the requirement of neighbourhood, 75 the neighbour principle, and the
neighbour as 'him'." It could also be argued that the concept of 'the
68 Manderson (2006), p 8.
69 Manderson (2006), as is clear from pp 28, 30, 70, and 202 knows this.
70 Derrida often speaks of the political, the juridical and the ethical in one breath; see
for example, Derrida (2005), p 172 note 12.
71 See Derrida (2005), p 152.
72 Abel (1990) clearly shows the political nature of all of tort law and the inequalities
it presently perpetrates. See also Hutchinson (1985).
73 See Manderson (2006), pp 56-57.
74 Manderson (2006), p 200; see also Levinas (1981), pp 82-83, 87.
75 Manderson (2006), p 184.
76 Manderson (2006), p 5.
77 Manderson (2006), p 25; see also Levinas (1981), pp 82-83, 87.
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reasonable man' is not used with sufficient circumspection by Manderson.
78
Should Manderson rather have followed Derrida, with his awareness of the
carno-phallogocentric nature79 of the tradition (also evident in Levinas), 80 he
would perhaps have shown a greater sensitivity to the historical plight of
women within the tradition of negligence law.8 1 'Animals', the environment
and non-citizens are similarly pushed to or even beyond the margins by
Manderson in his discussion of the law of negligence. Equality clearly has an
almost insignificant role to play in Manderson's conception of ethics. In
Rogues, Derrida speaks of absolute or incalculable equality in the same breath
as absolute hospitality and unconditional justice. 82 By also subscribing to
Derrida's interpretation of Levinas, the 'ethics' that Manderson espouses may
nevertheless be more influenced by '(hyper)politics' than he realises.
Responsibility
When talking about responsibility in ethical terms, something quite radical is
at stake for Manderson." 3 Responsibility is said to emerge 'with our selfhood,
with relationship, with desire'84 and the demand from the Other is said to
constitute me 'as a unique subject, a self. 85 Responsibility is not reciprocal;8 6
it is incalculable (in 'some sense', Manderson says);8 7 it is 'never abstract,
never conceived and predictable in advance'; 8 8 and 'it is always a specific andS , 89
contextual experience'. Translated into law, responsibility (specifically
insofar as proximity is concerned) is determined with reference to vulnerability
and control, with closeness playing an important role.90 Insofar as the standard
of care is concerned, responsibility becomes limited by our responsibility to
other Others.9 1 What concerns us here is the responsibility of a judge in
78 See Manderson (2006), p 187. On p 114 Manderson uses 'sic' after referring to the
,reasonable man'.
79 See Derrida (1992a), p 19.
80 See Derrida (1991), p 405; and Derrida (2002a), p 363 for criticism of Levinas
regarding his stance in relation to women.
81 For discussion see, for example, Wriggins (2005); Chamallas (1998); Bender
(1993).
82 Derrida (2005), pp 48-49, 52.
83 Manderson (2006), pp 5, 62-66.
Manderson (2006), p 63
85 Manderson (2006), p 65.
86 Manderson (2006), pp 63, 64.
87 Manderson (2006), pp 63, 190.
Manderson (2006), p 65.
89 Manderson (2006), p 65.
90 See further below.
91 See Manderson (2006), p 188. On pp 111, 115 and 186, Manderson states that the
concept of foreseeability is irrelevant to our understanding of responsibility. This
is because of the distinction that he wants to draw between proximity and
foreseeability. A similar distinction between wrongfulness and fault is, of course,
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evaluating a claim in negligence. The responsibility that the self in
Manderson's model has in relation to a vulnerable Other (proximity) obviously
makes judging in the law of negligence more difficult. As we will see in more
detail below, for Manderson, determining proximity does not take place in
accordance with rules. Manderson describes the responsibility that this entails
in the following terms:
The law of proximity set up a sympathetic resonance between the true
meaning of our responsibility for others (unresolved, retrospective,
nascent) and the structure through which that meaning ought to be
explored (ditto). Neither should this parallel surprise us. Responsibility
is always a kind of judgment in which we are confronted by difficult
choices but with no choice but to make them; in the face of the other,
we are indeed the chosen ones. Judges too are confronted by choices but
with no choice but to make them; in the face of the parties, they too are
the chosen ones.
92
Proximity in law, Manderson says, makes law recognise 'its own
response ability'. 93 The way in which Manderson understands legal
responsibility (the responsibility of a judge) ties in with his reading of Derrida
on justice. Justice, according to Manderson, and referring in the footnotes to
Force of Law (as well as to Sklar and Roberts) is:
internally riven between the operation of two mutually
incommensurable impulses: equal treatment and singular respect.
Justice embodies both an aspiration towards "law or right, legitimacy or
legality, stabilizable and statutory, calculable, a system of regulated and
coded prescriptions" and at the same time the desire for a unique and
singular response to a particular situation and person before us. Justice
is both general and unique; it involves treating everybody the same and
treating everybody differently.
94
It is not completely accurate to state that Derrida says justice requires that
everybody be treated the same and that everybody be treated differently."5
also a feature of other jurisdictions; see for example on South African law, Van
der Walt and Midgley (2005); Neethling et al (2006), but to seek to exempt
foreseeability from the notion of responsibility is problematic. As will be noted in
note 151, the concept of reasonableness which is an important part of the
foreseeability analysis can be said to have a paradoxical structure similar to that of
proximity.
92 Manderson (2006), p 199.
93 Manderson (2006), p 199.
Manderson (2006), p 194 (footnotes omitted).
95 This reading of Manderson (2006), p 181 seems to be partly based on a
misunderstanding of what Derrida (1995), pp 68 and 70 says about the Other and
other Others. As Derrida has himself explained, the absolute demand of the Other
(and the demands of other others) do not leave us with relativism. Instead it leaves
us with an infinite responsibility to all others: not only to people, but also to
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Roberts may say this. Derrida says something much more radical when he
talks about the importance of singularity for justice.96 There is a direct
correlation between Levinas's ethics and this infinite 'idea' of justice, as
appears from the following passage from Derrida's 'Force of Law':
infinite because it is irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other,
owed to the other before any contract, because it has come, the other's
coming as the singularity that is always other. This 'idea of justice'
seems to be irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift
without exchange, without circulation, without recognition or gratitude,
without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules,
without reason and without rationality.
97
Manderson also states that every case requires a judge to decide on 'the
applicability of prior general norms to the necessarily different and singular98
situation' before him or her. In this respect, Manderson says, judges have to
realise that they have a choice, a choice with which the past cannot help. They
have to respect the law in its generality and 'the individual in his utter
specificity'. Derrida is invoked as authority 100 for this construction of
responsibility as an existential one. Manderson describes this responsibility as
follows:
the moment of judgment - the answer to the question of whether and
how to follow 'the rules,' which must be singular and newly minted -
is a crucial moment in which the judge is singled out and rendered
irreplaceable, incapable of substitution by some mere procedure. The
burden is his and his alone, an inescapable responsibility.
10 1
The priority given to the calculating subject in legal decision-making is
clear from the above passage. In this respect, Manderson comes very close to
the views of many in the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, 0 2 although,
as we saw, Manderson would refer not to see this choice as a political one as
those in CLS mostly view it. In the above passage we also see clearly the
consequences of the kind of distinction that Manderson draws between a
Levinasian ethics and law. This distinction results in law not having to deal
'animals' and not only to those (people and animals) that are close to us, but also
those that are far away; see Derrida et al (2001), pp 68-69.
See Derrida (1992a), p 20.
97 Derrida (1992a), p 25.
98 Manderson (2006), p 194. See further below where the paradoxes that Manderson
sees in both justice and law are placed under scrutiny.
99 Manderson (2006), p 194.
100 Manderson (2006), pp 194-95.
101 Manderson (2006), p 195.
102 For critical discussion, see Van der Walt (1995), pp 329-54.
103 For a discussion of CLS, see Manderson (2006), pp 17-18.
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with the incalculability of unconditional justice; it results in law not being
obliged to acknowledge unconditional justice as part of its paradoxical
structure. Justice, as we see in the above passage from 'Force of Law', requires
that we do not calculate. 1 4 This does not simply translate into a duty to be
open and responsive, but to give oneself over to the impossible decision (that
is, absolute hospitality, unconditional justice), 'while taking account of law
and rules' 105
Proximity
Manderson's thinking about proximity clearly shows us the transformative
potential that this concept holds for the law of negligence. Manderson
describes ethical proximity with reference to Levinas as follows:
For Levinas, this word [ie proximity] implies a closeness to others who
can be approached but never reached. We are never exactly the same as
another person, and in the trauma of that distance lies summoned our
soul. "The relationship of proximity cannot be reduced to any modality
of distance or geometrical contiguity, or to the simple 'representation'
of a neighbour; it is already an assignation, an extremely urgent
assignation - an obligation, anachronously prior to any
commitment'. 106 Our difference and distance from others gives rise to
our responsibility for them. Levinas means by proximity something
fundamental to who we are and why we have a responsibility to others;
something which furthermore cannot be reduced to logic or knowledge
or rules. Proximity is an experience, emotional and bodily, and not an
idea. Incarnate in us, its implications 'exceed the limits of ontology, of
the human essence, and of the world'.
10 7
A number of issues will have to be addressed here relating to
Manderson's phenomenological approach 10 to proximity. The first issue is the
accuracy of Manderson's reading of Levinas's (non-)concept of proximity and
its subsequent translation into law. We also have to look here at the way in
which Manderson reads Derrida on the relation between law and justice, as this
fundamentally affects his translation of the notion of proximity into law. After
having examined these issues, I will attempt to set out a different structure for
the (non-)concept of proximity based on my reading of Derrida.
Manderson points out that Levinas's approach to proximity is marked by
the fact that it is not conceptual and that it relates to the relation with the
104 Manderson (2006), p 196 almost acknowledges this, but does not take it any
further: 'If Levinas "includes in justice [and law] almost everything he rejected in
his description of asymmetrical responsibility," thus creating an impassable barrier
between the two, Derrida does not.'
105 Derrida (1992a), p 24. See also Derrida (1992b), pp 71-72; Derrida and
Dufourmantelle (2000), pp 77, 79.
106 This is a quotation from Levinas (1981), pp 100-01.
107 Manderson (2006), p 14 (footnotes omitted).
108 See also the discussion above on Manderson's phenomenological approach.
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neighbour. 10 9 In addition to the rather irenic or at least non-violent terms in
which Manderson refers to proximity in the passage quoted above, he also
points out that proximity in Levinasian terms calls me in question, it singles
me out as responsible to others, it turns me into a hostage, and it persecutes
110
me. Manderson shows some discomfort with these descriptions and he is
quick to point out that proximity has inherent boundaries - it arises from
vulnerability and our own closeness to this vulnerability.11 2 This understanding
of proximity in Levinas makes its translation into law relatively easy. The
notion of asymmetry, which is central to Manderson's description of
responsibility and which seemed at first to be quite far-reaching in what it
requires from us, 113 is now understood as simply the relation of proximity or
closeness between one person who has a distinct capacity to control or to
respond and another who is vulnerable. 1 14 In this sense, one can also say that
the person in control or with the capacity to respond becomes 'hostage' to the
one who is vulnerable.11 5 In the case of omissions in the law of negligence, the
one 'in control' is obliged to assist the one who is vulnerable, and if he or she
does not, they will be held liable.
Manderson may, of course, be right in his interpretation and translation of
Levinas as limiting our responsibility to those that are close to us. This is
something that Derrida also finds problematic in Levinas. 116 It however needs
to be pointed out that the passage from Levinas which Manderson relies on in
support of this contention does not seem to justify this reading. Manderson 1 17
relies on the first part of the dedication of Levinas in Otherwise than Being, the
whole dedication of which reads as follows:
To the memory of those who were closest among the six million
assassinated by the Nationalist Socialists, and of the millions on
109 Manderson (2006), p 101.
110 Manderson (2006), p 102. Levinas (1981) also speaks about proximity in terms of
an obsession (p 87), a shuddering (p 87), and as a disturbance of the rememberable
time (p 89).
Manderson (2006), despite his use of the words boundary (p 103) and limit (p 156)
in relation to proximity, makes a great effort to show that proximity does not limit
responsibility (p 103), but that it creates the relationship of responsibility (pp 105,
141). When the criticism of Manderson's phenomenological approach as set out
above is, however, accepted, this distinction can no longer stand. Proximity, as
Manderson defines it, clearly does place a limit on responsibility.
112 Manderson (2006), p 102 03.
113 See Manderson (2006), pp 49, 51-72, 183.
114 Manderson (2006), pp 93, 141, 158.
115 See Manderson (2006), p 124 (also p 135): 'We are proximate to those who are
distinctly vulnerable to us, regardless of what we know. And those who are
hostages to our fortune return the favour, making us hostage to our responsibility
for them in return. We do not choose to be responsible; on the contrary, their
vulnerability identifies us.'
116 Derrida (2002a), p 363.
11 Manderson (2006), p 102.
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millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of
the other man, the same anti-Semitism.
The dedication seems to say exactly the opposite of what Manderson
asserts.118 If the criticism expressed above regarding the carno-phallogocentric
nature of Manderson's discourse as well as of his phenomenological approach
is accepted, it appears that Manderson's notion of proximity is ultimately a
restricted ethical, lejal and political concept. It may not be reducible to a
code" 9 or to rules, 2 but it remains something calculable. It entails an
economy which returns to the self. It requires only the possible from the
-. 121
defendant and, where its interests are at stake, the community. TheS.122
impossible is not required. It tells us that the law that we have is essentially
just, although it may require minor alterations here and there. In other words, it
serves to legitimise the current legal system. It specifically serves to justify the
limitations that the law places or would place on liability in terms of
Manderson's model. This appears to be at odds with the disruptive practice of
deconstruction which Manderson subscribes to, as well as with at least the
spirit of Levinas's project. Does Manderson's approach not in the end share
with those approaches that he criticises (ie corrective and distributive justice)
the feature that they ensure a good conscience?1 2 3 Manderson does anticipate
this criticism when he says that he makes no apologies if his approach to
Levinas 'has become contaminated by the pragmatics of law. That is the point
of ethics: it is necessarily governed by ingratitude and betrayal if it is to be
spoken at all.' Is this attempt to escape from responsibility for the Other not
somewhat too glib and easy? Is betrayal already necessary when we theorise
about (negligence) law?
18 The argument in the following passage in Manderson (2006), p 172 is also not
convincing to me: 'If Levinas appears to suggest sometimes that we are all
neighbours, all indistinguishably "close to me," yet he also insists here on our
obligation to "those closest to us." The very idea of closeness and of
neighbourhood, implies something relative. When he claims that "you personally
are implicated each time that somewhere humanity is guilty," he adds, crucially
but parenthetically, "especially when it's somewhere close to you." This
subservient clause is key. The word "especially" ought not be treated as an
afterthought that highlights the proximity of the moment; on the contrary, it
expresses the condition that summons it into existence.'
19 See Manderson (2006), p 102.
120 See Manderson (2006), p 112.
121 See, for example, Manderson (2006), p 96: 'In the first place, the duty of care
arises from one's response ability. Though the duty may fall to any one of us, its
extent will depend on our capacity. Responsibility encumbers me commensurate
only with my ability and my resources.'
122 See Derrida (2002b), p 343 on the impossible.
123 This in spite of passages that assert the contrary: see, for example, Manderson
(2006), p 200 where he says that justice is always out of reach, never just enough.
Proximity, he says (p 200), 'is the immanent possibility of an ongoing rebellion
against complacency'.
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On my reading, proximity in Levinas 1 24 plays a similar role as 'the
welcome' in Totality and Infinity12 5 which Derrida analyses in Adieu.
126
Proximity and the welcome consist in a responsibility for the Other, as
Manderson correctly points out. This responsibility is, however, not a modest
one (as the terms 'hostage' and 'persecution' clearly point out), but one where
the subject is put in question in a profound manner. Proximity and the
welcome entail an incalculable responsibility which makes a hostage of the
host.1 27 For Derrida, the welcome that Levinas speaks of is irreducibly
violent.12 8 Insofar as law (a restricted economy) is concerned, Derrida and
Manderson clearly have different conceptions of it. Whereas Derrida focuses
our minds on the violent institution and illegitimacy of all legal-political
systems, 12 9 Manderson, as we saw, attempts to legitimise a projected future
legal system (in relation to tort law). The violence that Derrida speaks of in
this regard is repeated in every law-conserving act of judicial enforcement.
Derrida does, of course, not make this point in order to make us sceptical about
law. In every such act, as Naas points out:
the master's authority is not simply interrupted or immobilized but is
shown to be self-justifying, which is to say, ultimately unjustified, the
result of a 'mystical authority' wherein the master - like real life - is
always absent.
130
In every law-conserving act, we have a chance of considering again the
unjust nature of our institutions. Manderson knows this and he calls for such
an approach. There is, however, more to this point than immediately meets the
eye. Every law-conserving act also gives a chance for and poses the threat of
unconditional justice, of absolute hospitality. Although it would not be wrong
to say that this implies that law should be 'responsive', it clearly entails more
than this. Manderson comes close to describing the 'monstrous' 131 nature of
absolute hospitality 13  and unconditional justice when he describes with
124 See Levinas (1981), pp 61-97.
125 Levinas (1969).
126 Derrida (1999).
127 Manderson (2006), p 59 acknowledges this (also on pp 60 and 80): 'The host may
at any moment become the hostage. In the vulnerability of this interaction we may
find ourselves harmed or exploited. But Levinas' point is that the danger is
necessary and inevitable. On the one hand "the self is through and through a
hostage, older than the ego, prior to principles."'
128 See Derrida (1999), p 59. See also Bennington (2000), p 28.
129 Den-ida (1992a), pp 6, 13.
130 Naas (2003), p 14.
131 See Derrida (2005), p 144.
132 See, for example, Derrida (2002a), p 361: 'to be hospitable is to let oneself be
overtaken, to not even let oneself be overtaken, to be surprised, in a fashion almost
violent, violated and raped [vioke], stolen [voh~e] ... precisely where one is not
ready to receive - and not only not yet ready but not ready, unprepared in a
mode that is not even that of the "not yet"'.
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reference to Levinas the risk that we run 'in being touched by the other ... The
host may at any moment become the hostage. This gives expression to the
'sense' of the opening we are faced with in the event of law-conserving
violence. Manderson nevertheless does not develop this thought to its limit in, • 134
his analysis. This opening, to stress the point, is not a neutral opening; it is
an opening towards absolute hospitality. Derrida has stated this clearly in his
reading of Levinas:
'Openness can be understood in several senses' ... The 'third meaning'
is ... important for Levinas; it concerns the 'denuding of the skin
exposed,' the 'vulnerability of a skin exposed, in wounds and outrage,
beyond all that can show itself,' 'sensibility' 'offered to the caress,' but
also 'open like a city declared open upon the approach of the enemy.'
Unconditional hospitality would be this vulnerability - at once
passive, exposed, and assumed.
135
Manderson is right to point us to the importance of proximity in the law
of negligence. On my reading, his (non-)concept nevertheless aims at shielding
itself off from its own unconditionality. As we saw above, Manderson
understands the legal concept of proximity in very similar terms to Levinas's
ethical proximity. This is, of course, only possible because of the rather
modest meaning that he attributes to Levinas's concept of proximity. Reading
the 'hyperethical' or 'hyperpolitical' concept of proximity through the texts of
Derrida, I would like to lay greater stress on its paradoxical structure as well as
the excess which 'inhabits' that structure. Manderson does point to a
paradoxical structure (in fact, three), but his structures are different from the
ones I detect in the law of negligence. As we saw above, Manderson
distinguishes between ethics on the one hand and law and justice on the
other. He consequently, following Derrida, points out that 'there is a tension
between law, in the traditional sense of a stable body of rules, and justice'.1 38
Manderson, however, also detects a tension within justice and a tension within
law. Justice, according to Manderson, requires both equal treatment on the one
hand and singular respect or 'treating everybody differently' on the other. 139
Law, says Manderson, is riven by a similar tension: on the one hand it requires
133 Manderson (2006), p 59.
134 Manderson (2006), p 60 (see also above) prefers not to understand this literally.
Compare in this respect Van der Walt (1998), pp 92-93.
135 See Derrida (1999), pp 53-54 read with p 141 fn 51.
136 See further Manderson (2006), pp 98-145.
137 See Manderson (2006), p 19: 'But justice and law surely proceed from the ethical
relation found in proximity.' On p 19 Manderson also states that ethical
responsibility 'establishes both a sense of self and a sense of relationship, and they
in turn create the very possibility of agreement, and law, and justice.'
138 Manderson (2006), p 194.
139 Manderson (2006), p 194.
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the application of prior general rules, and on the other, a unique response to a
.... 140
different and singular situation.
On Manderson's reading, and as stated before, the legal concept of
proximity is the 'site' in law where Levinas's ethics finds its 'home':
14 1
From Deane J onwards, the word 'proximity' and all the discussions
that have swirled about it, have suggested precisely the operations of a
judgment that cannot be entirely settled in advance and that remain
sensitive to the particular and the experiential - the place of the ethical
in law, 'the other in the same'.
142
The concept of proximity thus facilitates law's openness or
responsiveness to the Other. We have to quote Manderson here at length:
In the law of torts, proximity is the structural site in which a
receptiveness to the experience of others had been purposely kept open,
an institutionalised and unstable force for change. It is the part of the
'third,' or social, realm that witnesses our rendezvous with the other,
providing a space for a 'never-ending oscillation' between ethics and
politics. It is the moment in our judicial reasoning wherein the 'saying'
of responsibility may still surprise the 'said' of law. Proximity identifies
the possibility of a non-appropriative relationship with the neighbour, or
le prochain, and at the same time it articulates the conditions under
which we find ourselves with a responsibility to respect it ... After all,
the application of rules or methods is just what our response ability
cannot hide behind, and just the kind of a priori reasoning that
circumstance always exceeds.
43
Apart from the moderate tones within which proximity is cast in the
above passage, there is nothing here that I cannot subscribe to. I nevertheless
want us to rethink the legal concept of proximity by looking at what Derrida
says regarding the relation between law and justice. Manderson's is an
interesting interpretation of this relation in Derrida's 'Force of Law'. It is not,
however, one that, on my reading, is supported by Derrida's text. The
paradoxes that we find in Derrida's texts where normative concepts are
analysed or deconstructed 144 are always between the unconditional and the
conditional: the pure gift and gifts which expect a return;1 45 absolute
hospitality and conditional versions thereof;146 unconditional justice and
law.' 47 It is correct to say, as Manderson does, that for Derrida, 'alterity "is
140 Manderson (2006), p 194.
141 The word 'home' is my term, not Manderson's.
142 Manderson (2006), p 196.
143 Manderson (2006), p 197.
144 See in this regard Derrida (2002a), p 362.
145 See Derrida (1992c).
148 Derrida and Dufourmantelle (2000); Derrida (2002a).
147 Derrida (1992a).
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already in the same"'. 148 Derrida's texts do not however speak of two separate
spheres in tension with each other (for example law and justice) each with its
own paradoxes. 'Alterity within the same' means that the trace of justice -
the unconditional - 'is' the condition of possibility of law. That is that, and
Manderson admirably points us to proximity in this regard. 14 9 It cannot
however be said that for Derrida there is a separate sphere of justice which is
riven by the same paradox.
150
A judge faced with a case of negligence would on my reading of Derrida
be confronted with the following aporia: on the one hand, proximity as
absolute hospitality (a hospitality beyond responsiveness); on the other,
proximity as hospitality in a limited sense (perhaps in the sense of• 15115
responsiveness). A judge would have to negotiate this aporia. 15 2 As we saw
above, the failure of Manderson to acknowledge this paradoxical structure has
the consequence that his concept of proximity does not allow for the
interruption of its own restricted economy. It consequently also poses no
challenge to the capitalist system of Western economies, which is literally
structured by the law of torts. 153 In other jurisdictions, tort law is referred to as
the 'law of delict'. Delict: 'from Latin delictum: a fault, crime, from delinquere
to fail, do wrong'. 1 54 Tort: 'from old French, from Medieval Latin tortum,
literally: something twisted'. 15 Do tort law and delict law not then speak of a
promise to address wrongs?1 5 6 Could we perhaps hear in them an echo of the
saying, making us tremble1 5 7 as they call on us to address the crimes, failures,
wrong-doings, twisted consequences of the economic system of neo-liberalism
from which many of us benefit1 5 8 (apart from addressing the many other
148 Manderson (2006), p 193.
149 See also Derrida (1973), pp 142-43 on the trace. As I will contend in note 151,
proximity is not the only trace of the unconditional in law.
150 This confusion might be caused by the fact that Derrida (1992a) sometimes speaks
of 'law' and sometimes of 'justice as law'.
151 I do not have space here for a comprehensive analysis of the notions of public
policy and reasonableness as employed by Manderson (2006), pp 86-90, 104-18,
and 184-91. It would have to suffice here to state that these notions could, on a
Derridean reading, be said to have a paradoxical structure similar to that of
proximity; see in this respect Derrida (2005).
152 This is what 'undecidability' means in Derrida's terminology, and not simply the
difficulty or openness of judgment, as Manderson (2006), p 113 appears to
believe; see Derrida (1992a), pp 24-26.
153 See Derrida (1995), pp 85-86.
14 Collins English Dictionary.
155 Collins English Dictionary.
15 See Derrida (1996), pp 77 at 82-83 on the promise as belonging to the structure of
language.
157 See Derrida (1995), p 53.
158 See also Derrida (1994), pp 81-85.
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'crimes', failures and wrong-doings in the world)? 159 Through Manderson's
model, the Other would still be viewed from within a (safe) horizon which is
primarily concerned with protecting the self from the Other. Through
Manderson's model, absolute hospitality would stand no chance. If we follow
Manderson, proximity would not allow for the interruption of the subjectivity
of community.
Conclusion
To conclude, Proximity, Levinas, and the Soul of Law is a wonderful, soulful
book, a book that everyone who has a concern for justice should read. It is
Manderson's genius to construct a new and much more empathetic law of
negligence through reliance on the Levinasian concept of proximity.
Practically, his proposal would entail a much wider ranging duty of care where
we would be liable in more instances for our omissions than is the position in
many jurisdictions at present. In this article, I nevertheless raised a number of
questions regarding the limits of Manderson's model through his reliance on a
number of Levinasian concepts. It was argued here that any attempt to
'translate' Levinas into law has to take account of the Derridean
deconstruction of Levinas's texts. Manderson unfortunately does not always
do this. This leads him to posit an ethics outside of law and justice, outside of
the law of negligence, outside of the law of torts, and outside of the law in
general. Unlike the self, who Manderson burdens with a responsibility for the
Other, the law is constructed in a way so that it is permitted to exist only for
itself- that is, for the community, and especially those who benefit from the
dispensation in place. In a case that comes to court the Other would, in terms
of Manderson's model, still be appropriated (by the community) 'as a mere
factor in a calculus of overall utility . It was pointed out that the law does
not escape from the movement of differance. The trace of the Other is also to
159 Many would, of course, disagree with imposing this function on tort law - see,
for example, Du Bois (2000), pp 23-24. These wrongs can only be addressed
through large-scale intervention. One way of addressing at least some of these
would be national and international no-fault insurance schemes for certain types of
injury. Such schemes could be an important means of furthering equality, thereby
seeking to come as close as possible to the incalculable equality that Derrida
(2005), p 49 speaks of. To ensure fairness, the size of contributions would have to
be determined with reference to inter alia the risk created, something which would
in certain instances have to be determined and paid retroactively. There would, of
course, be many practical difficulties in administering such schemes, and it is
always possible for such schemes to be appropriated by dominant interests,
thereby maintaining the status quo. For a scheme to achieve justice in the sense
described above, it would furthermore have to be able to address all wrongs
(unconditional equality). Even with such schemes, the courts could still have an
important function in addressing wrongs (both nationally and internationally), for
example with regard to injuries not covered by such schemes and by granting
punitive or exemplary damages in certain cases. For Manderson's (critical) views
on no-fault schemes, see Manderson (2006), p 201.
160 See Manderson (2006), p 33.
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be found inside of law in the 'form' of unconditional justice or absolute
hospitality. The question was raised whether judges evaluating a claim in
negligence can, under Manderson's model, really be said to be hospitable
when the Other is limited to the brother. The only way in which the Other can
be approached as Other, welcomed as Other, is if the paradoxical and
overflowing structure of legal concepts is exposed and if these paradoxes are
taken seriously. It was pointed out that the notion of proximity (and possibly
also some of the other key concepts of the law of negligence such as public
policy, and reasonableness) has a paradoxical structure (the conditional and the
unconditional, the calculable and the incalculable). This structure entails an
openness towards the abyss, an abyss which any judgment relating to a claim
in negligence faces: a complete selflessness, absolute hospitality, incalculable
reason. Only by negotiating between these antinomies in a matter that comes to
court, can communal subjectivity be interrupted; only in this way can there be
a chance for absolute hospitality.
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